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STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Review of the Relevance of the Suicide Evidence 
The State indicates that the question of the relevance of the suicide evidence should be 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State's brief at 1, citing Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining, 944 
P.2d 357 (Utah 1997). Jones cites the standard of review under Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and is 
not directly applicable to the question of relevance under Rule 401. While there are older Utah 
cases indicating that questions of relevance are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, e ^ Bambrough 
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286,1290 (Utah 1976), more recent cases demonstrate that the Court may 
consider the actual function performed by the trial court in determining the level of deference to be 
granted to a particular ruling of the trial court. See e,g. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938-39 (Utah 
1994). See also State v. Doporto. 935 P.2d 484,490 (Utah 1998)(implying that abuse of discretion 
standard of review does not necessarily apply to questions of general relevance). 
Given the simplicity of determining the relevance of the suicide evidence, this Court should 
review the trial court's ruling on this issue with very little deference. .See Pena. 
2. Review of the Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction 
The State indicates that "Whether an instruction properly states the standard of proof is a 
question of law, State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219,1231 (Utah 1997), with the specific wording left 
to the trial court's discretion. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,1146 (Utah 1989)." State's brief at 
2. The portion of the Johnson opinion referred to is a plurality opinion which does not indicate that 
a trial judge has discretion to choose the wording of an instruction. A standard granting trial courts 
much discretion in stating the law injury instructions would be incompatible with several Utah cases 
1 
reviewing given jury instructions for correctness. See e.g. Ong International v. 11th Avenue Corp., 
850 P.2d 447,452 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State begins its statement of facts with footnote 4, which states, 
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict but, nevertheless, argues the relevancy and prejudice of excluded evidence. 
Defendant disclaims his responsibility to marshal the facts {Brief of Appellant 
[Br.App.J at 25), and impermissibly states facts supporting his theory while ignoring 
adverse evidence. See State v. ScheeL 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1991). The 
State recites the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993). 
State's brief at 4 n.4. 
In his statement of facts, Mr. Jaeger has not ignored adverse evidence, but has attempted to 
summarize the evidence in a thorough and accurate manner, in order to facilitate the Court's review 
of the issues presented.1 Jaeger's approach is consistent with U*ah law; even when appellate Courts 
recite the facts in the manner most favorable to the jury's verdict, the Courts also acknowledge 
evidence conflicting with the verdict when doing so is necessary to understanding the issues 
presented. See e.g. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993). 
Mr. Jaeger did not disclaim a responsibility to marshal the evidence, but attempted to marshal 
the evidence when he challenged Judge Wilkinson's reasoning that the suicide evidence was 
irrelevant because it was too speculative and because Ms. Bamdt was appreciably more mature at 
the time of her death than at the time she reported having attempted suicide. See Jaeger's opening 
brief at 24-25. 
Because Jaeger has not raised insufficiency of the evidence, he has no obligation to marshal 
the evidence in stating the facts. Cf. State v. ScheeL 823 P.2d 470,473 (Utah App. 1991 )(discussing 
marshaling requirement in the context of a claim of insufficient evidence). 
2 
Aside from the State's choice to state the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, review of the record demonstrates that the State is in error in several instances in its 
statement of the facts.2 
2 
The State disputes that the officers were vague in establishing the location of the gun when 
the officers arrived, and claims that the gun was "but one or two feet" from Barndt's right foot. 
State's brief at 5 and n.6, citing R. 824, 834-35. Pages 824, 834 and 835 of the record do not 
indicate the distance that the gun was lying from Barndt's foot or feet. 
The State indicates, "The police officers taped 'brand new' brown lunch bags taken from a 
kitchen drawer over Mary's hands to preserve evidence. (R. 836-37, 845, 856)." State's brief at 5. 
The cited pages of the record do not establish that the bags were actually brand new, but indicate that 
the officer who grabbed them out of the kitchen drawer thought they looked brand new, but did not 
know if they had been used before. 
The State indicates, "Defendant was escorted to his living room where he calmed down (R. 
864,870,872-73,875). The police officer who interviewed him felt that 'pretty much' they carried 
on a 'normal conversation' (id.)." State's brief at 5. The record pages cited by the State nowhere 
indicate that the officer said that they "pretty much" carried on a "normal conversation." While the 
officer characterized his and Jaeger's conversation as calm, and said that Jaeger eventually settled 
down (R. 875), he also said that Jaeger was excited to say the least (R. 872), upset and emotional (R. 
873). 
The State indicates, "Despite his alleged fear, defendant admitted that he tried to call Begay 
that night to tell him to come over because Begay owed him money (R. 584)." State's brief at 6 n.5. 
Pages 584 and 585 of the record demonstrate that Jaeger was calling around to find Begay, who 
owed him money, but make no mention of Jaeger intending to tell Begay to come over. 
The State indicates that James Gaskill "explained that batteries or other automotive sources 
could not account for the presence of all three elements: 'I can't think of any source of all three of 
those coming together in the form of a spherical particle [except for gunshot]. I've never 
encountered it' (R. 283, 284-86; see also R. 481)." State's brief at 8. Gaskill testified that had not 
tested the environment where Jaeger worked and did not know if spherical particles described as 
unique to GSR would be found in Jaeger's workplace (R. 286). 
The State indicates, "The rest of the workplace particles were inconsistent with the GSR 
particles found on defendant's hands in that the workplace particles contained lead, a substance not 
found in gunshot residue (R. 468-470)." State's brief at 9. Lead is actually one of the three elements 
normally found in GSR (R. 985-986). 
The State indicates, "Nor did the bags removed from Mary's hands have 'great[] forensic 
significance' in this case {Br. App. at 17). Gaskill explained that it was 'not very important' to test 
the bags (R. 302)." State's brief at 10 n.7. Page 302 of the record contains no testimony by Gaskill 
that testing the bags was "not very important," but includes his opinion that the forensic value of the 
bags would have been minimal because it would have taken a long time to test the large, fibrous 
bags. 
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The State indicates, "Defendant's claim that the use of bags has 'questionable scientific 
validity' (Br. App. at 17), ignores the expert's complete testimony. Gaskill was asked about one 
scientific journal article which expressed some 'reservations' ^bout the use of bagging as a means 
of preserving evidence. Gaskill testified that while the article noted a possible weakness in the 
process (R. 300), bagging was still the best way of preserving evidence (R. 295)." State's brief at 
10 n.7. Gaskill acknowledged that the article in question was published in a learned treatise he 
sometimes relied on, and testified that he did not disagree with the article's conclusion that the 
practice of bagging the hands of GSR test subjects may result in the destruction of evidence (R. 300). 
The State claims, "In Mr. Gaskill's opinion, it would be impossible to fire this particular gun 
without getting residue on the hands of the shooter. (R. 994-95)" State's brief at 11. Gaskill's 
testimony was that he would expect to find GSR on the hands of the person who had fired the gun 
"except that it's of course possible to wipe it off or wash your hands." (R. 995). 
The State indicates, "And even though a lack of GSR is not conclusive proof that the tested 
person is not the shooter, Gaskill explained that this was because, theoretically, the person after 
firing the gun could remove all GSR by washing their hands under running water or by some similar 
act (R. 475-76, 988). Even assuming that Mary fired the gun and her hands had been rubbed as 
Defendant hypothesized, Gaskill testified that he would still expect some GSR to be on her hands 
(R. 320)." Gaskill actually testified that the GSR may not have deposit on a shooter's hands in the 
first place, or that it could be removed entirely by rubbing off in a bag, by coming in contact with 
fluids, clothing, another person's hands, or during medical treatment (R. 476-77). While page 302 
indicates that Gaskill testified that he would not have expected all the GSR to have been removed 
from Ms. Barndt's hands by her flailing around with bags on her hands, he was not asked if other 
factors or activities in this case might have resulted in the absence of GSR on her hands (R. 302). 
The State indicates, "He admitted that he had not told the truth when he previously said he 
had dry-fired the gun (R. 606-07, 617-18, 620, 626)." State's brief at 11. None of the cited pages 
support this assertion; they indicate that Jaeger thought he had not dry-fired the gun that night, but 
could not recall and may have done so, as he told the detective. 
The State indicates, "Defendant claims on appeal that the 911 tape supports the theory that 
the gun was next to Mary's hand and then moved by defendant at the direction of the operator (Br. 
App. at 13). He also contends that it was only due to the passage of time that he could not remember 
if he had actually moved it (Br. App. at 12). Defendant made neither of these contentions below. 
He consistently denied that he touched the gun until, faced with the positive GSR results, he began 
offering shifting theories of how the residue got on his hands. Defendant never stated that he 
actually moved the weapon (R. 602-03,626-27,867-68,921 -22,834,955)." State's brief at 13 n. 12. 
In his testimony, Jaeger was never certain about whether or not he touched the gun. Consistent with 
Jaeger's testimony, his brief indicates only that Jaeger may have touched the gun, and refers to 
testimony from one of the responding officers indicating that Jaeger was so upset when the police 
arrived that he may have touched the gun and honestly not have recalled having done so (R. 957). 
Jaeger's opening brief at 12-13. See also id- at 12 n. 13 (demonstrating that Jaeger never took the 
opportunity to conform the facts to explain the GSR results, despite having been informed by the 
police about possible explanations for how the GSR came to be on his hands). The State indicates, 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EXCLUSION OF THE PAST SUICIDE ATTEMPT AS IRRELEVANT 
VIOLATED JAEGER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE 
AND REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
I. THE FACTS ESTABLISHED BY THE RECORD 
The State errs in describing Judge Wilkinson's ruling excluding the ARTEC records. While 
the State maintains that the fourth reason that Judge Wilkinson excluded the records was that "there 
was no expert evidence to otherwise establish the relevance or probativeness of the 1986 statement 
"On cross examination, the medical examiner agreed that it was theoretically possible that a person 
of Mary's size could self-inflict this type of wound but only if she fully extended her right arm, 
simultaneously shrugged her shoulders to raise her clavicle, and then used her thumb to pull the 
trigger (R. 365-67, 373)." State's brief at 14. Pages 365, 366, and 373 of the record do not indicate 
that Leis testified that Ms. Barndt would have had to fully extend her arm, but merely indicate that 
she could have shot herself if she used her thumb to pull the trigger. Pages 365, 366 and 373 of the 
record do not indicate that Ms. Bamdt would have had to simultaneously shrug while fully extending 
her arm, but indicate that the trajectory of the bullet indicated that if Ms. Bamdt shot herself, she may 
have shrugged, flinched, changed her mind, covered her face with the non-shooting hand, or done 
something else. 
The State indicates that Jaeger "admitted on cross-examination, that it was 'possible' that 
during their argument, he had thrown [the bra] at her, telling her to put it on (R. 600-01, 643-44)." 
State's brief at 17-18. Jaeger's testimony was that he did not remember anything about the bra, but 
that he guessed "anything could be possible." (R. 643). 
The State indicates, "[DJefense counsel attempted to characterize Mary's statement about her 
child as one of outside adoption. But Judy Clark clarified that while Judy may have used the 
'adoption' in speaking with the police she simply meant having the natural father take the child (R. 
394, 428)." Actually, while defense counsel did note that Ms. Clark did not mention the father in 
discussing Ms. Barndt's fears of giving her baby up for adoption (R. 428), defense counsel discussed 
Ms. Barndt's comments about "giving the child up for adoption to a family member" in cross-
examining Dr. Leis (R. 368). 
The State indicates, "He was also finalizing a 'rough' divorce and was concerned about the 
divorce's impact in his children (id. [apparently referring to the previous record citations to R. 633, 
636, 898-99])." State's brief at 20. While one of the owners of the shop where Jaeger worked 
testified that Jaeger was going through a divorce in August of 1990, and was concerned about its 
impact on his children if the owner could recall correctly (R. 898-99), Jaeger actually testified that 
the divorce was final in August of 1990, and that he was not suffering stress as a result of the divorce 
at that time, because his wife was letting him take his children (R. 633, 635-636). 
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to the events of 1990," State's brief at 24,3 Judge Wilkinson did not indicate that this was a basis for 
exclusion of the evidence, when he finally ruled, stating, 
The court has read exhibit No. 45, and the court would sustain the state's 
objection to it, that 99 percent of it is irrelevant. The court finds it's very speculative, 
both as to content and as to the time element. 
(R. 657). 
There are statements throughout the document pertaining to suicide, which 
are contrary to what is expressed in the statement which you want admitted; 
therefore, the court would feel that it's very speculative. The court would feel that 
it was at a time when a person was being admitted to an institution for being 
ungovernable, when she was a teenager of 15 years, and that time element would be 
a factor here, and the court would deny the admissibility of the document." 
(R. 668).4 
Judge Wilkinson had initially indicated that the medical examiner's testimony opened the 
door regarding Ms. Barndt's suicidal tendencies (R. 416). He indicated his doubts about whether 
the alleged prior suicide in the ARTEC records would be admissible on the other defense theory -
to counter the State's evidence that Ms. Barndt was not in a suicidal state of mind at the time of her 
death, and queried whether there would be expert testimony to demonstrate that a suicide attempt 
in Ms. Barndt's past would be probative of the likelihood that she were capable of suicide in 1990. 
But he did not indicate that such expert testimony was a prerequisite to the admission of the evidence 
3 
The State repeats this assertion on pages 29, 33 and 41 of its brief. 
4 
The actual language of Judge Wilkinson's ruling also calls into question the State's argument 
that the judge's ruling implicitly reflected the court's "concern that a battle over Mary's state of mind 
in 1986 would be time consuming and misdirect the jury from the relevant issue which was her state 
of mind in 1990 (R. 416, 553, 657, 668)." State's brief at 34, continued n.26. 
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(R. 416-417).5 While Judge Wilkinson did at one point indicate that the defense "would need to 
have the person come and testify," (R. 555), it appears that this was a reference to his earlier 
suggestion that defense counsel bring the records custodian to an in camera hearing (R. 416), and 
was not a ruling that expert testimony was needed to establish the relevance of the testimony for 
impeaching Dr. Leis's conclusion that Barndt was a homicide victim. 
The State claims that the medical examiner was the only witness who opined on the 
likelihood that Barndt had committed suicide, and that other witnesses were only asked about Ms. 
Immediately after defense counsel argued that the records were admissible to challenge the 
medical examiner's opinion that Ms. Barndt did not commit suicide, which was based in part on a 
lack of suicidal history, and to challenge the testimony of other of the State's witnesses who 
indicated that Ms. Barndt was planning for her future and did not seem suicidal at the time of her 
death (R. 415), Judge Wilkinson stated, 
The court would allow the defense to bring in a records keeper form R-tech, 
and that I would want an in camera hearing at that point to see just exactly what this 
is and where it's going. 
I'm of this opinion, that I think that the statement made by the medical 
examiner this morning does open the door as far as the tendencies to commit suicide, 
because one of the elements which he said was that she didn't have that tendency, or 
it was not apparent. 
So I understand what you're saying on the other, too; I'm not persuaded by 
those. It does raise an issue in the court's mind as to when the person had been in 
1986, when she would have been what, 15? 
MR. BRASS: Sixteen, to age 16. 
THE COURT: That there is quite a bit of difference there as far as a young, 
ungovernable teenager, and a 19-year-old. There's quite a bit of difference. 
And I don't know that either of you have testimony, or if you're going to have 
testimony from anybody, as an expert, as to what that would mean. 
Of course, I'm thinking of the medical examiner. But at this point, I would 
not let it in without an in camera hearing. Then I would make that determination. 
(R. 416-17). 
7 
Barndt's mood and demeanor in the summer of 1990, and about her conversations with them on the 
day she died. State's brief at 29 n. 24, citing R. 456-57,484-85, 897, 903-04.6 
Actually, numerous witnesses testified either directly or to the effect that Mary Barndt was 
planning for her future and was unlikely to commit suicide.7 
The State claims that "it was undisputed that Mary was not despondent and had not made 
suicidal threats in 1990 (R. 610), and had no suicidal thoughts while ARTEC in 1986-87 (R. 414), 
the caseworker's note was the only evidence that Mary had any 'history of suicide.'" State's brief 
at 31. 
Page 610 of the record is Mr. Jaeger's testimony that Ms. Barndt was not upset or angry and 
did not appear to be despondent when she came to see him at work on the day she died, and does not 
address whether she was depressed or threatened suicide in 1990. 
6 
This argument is repeated on page 36 of the State's brief. 
7 
Ms. Barndt's mother testified that she did not think that Mary committed suicide when the 
police called to report Mary's death, and that she was never in a group therapy session wherein Mary 
discussed having attempted suicide(R. 440, 443). She testified that in her last conversation with 
Mary, Mary told her she would call her tomorrow and said other things indicating her plans for the 
future (R. 431). Ms. Barndt's mother also volunteered, "[S]he never told me that she wanted to kill 
herself, ever." (R. 442). 
When the prosecutor asked Paul Miller if there was "anything that would indicate to [him] 
in [his] contact with Mary Barndt that would suggest she would try to commit suicide," Mr. Miller 
said there was not, and found her to be a nice girl with a bubbly personality, although he did not 
know her well (R. 903-04). 
Ms. Barndt's father testified that by nature, Mary was irrepressible and "couldn't be put 
down," and had plans for her future(R. 484,488). 
Ms. Barndt's brother testified that she was not despondent or depressed, but was bubbly and 
enjoyed life and doing things and was excited about her future plans (R. 456-58). 
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The State repeatedly seeks to undermine the reliability of the ARTEC records by noting that 
the records contained only the uncorroborated claim of an "ungovernable fifteen year old" that she 
had attempted suicide. State's brief at 32-33, 39. 
The ARTEC records include not only the statement of Ms. Barndt, but also other references 
to a suicide attempt which are not attributed specifically to Ms. Barndt, and an indication that Ms. 
Barndt was referred to the residential program for a suicide attempt. See Defense Exhibits 45 and 
45A. 
The State claims that the absence of any known history of suicide was not a major factor in 
the medical examiner's opinion that Barndt did not commit suicide, and argues that the lack of 
suicide history was only discussed "in connection with his conclusion that the range of firing was 
atypical of suicide." State's brief at 42 n.32. 
The lack of a suicide history and range of firing were separate, unrelated, major factors 
underlying the medical examiner's opinion that Bamdt did not commit suicide (R. 355, 368). 
II. APPLICABLE LAW 
A. THE ARTEC RECORDS WERE ADMISSIBLE AS NON-HEARSAY FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF IMPEACHMENT, 
The State argues that the ARTEC records were hearsay because they were only valuable if 
true in alleging a prior suicide attempt by Ms. Barndt. State's brief at 30-31. While the truth of the 
suicide records would certainly have been helpful to Mr. Jaeger's case, the records were not 
admissible solely to prove their truth, but were admissible for impeachment of Dr. Leis, who based 
his conclusion that Ms. Bamdt was murdered in part on her purported lack of a history of suicide. 
The records were admissible for impeachment of the other witnesses who testified concerning Ms. 
9 
Bamdt's history and character as a non-suicidal person. Cf. e ^ Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 
539 (Utah 1981)(in ruling that medical texts were admissible to cross-examine the opponent's 
expert's opinion, the Court stated, "Since the texts in this case were not offered as substantive 
evidence, but rather to discredit the witness's testimony, there was no hearsay problem."), overruled 
on other grounds. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). 
B. THE RECORDS WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE MEDICAL RECORDS 
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, 
The State contends that the ARTEC records were properly excluded despite their status as 
medical records, because the records were contradictory regarding whether Ms. Barndt was ever 
suicidal, and unclear about the details of any alleged attempted suicide. State's brief at 31-33. 
While the records demonstrate that Ms. Barndt was unwilling to disclose details of her 
suicide attempt, the records are not confusing in documenting her report of a suicide attempt. This 
Court's review of the records, which have been transmitted to this Court as exhibits 45 and 45 A, will 
demonstrate that Ms. Barndt frequently denied present suicidal ideation at the time of her stay in 
ARTEC, but that she revealed a suicide attempt prior to her entry into the ARTEC program. Cf. 
State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136,1139 (Utah 1977)(statement was not admissible for various reasons, 
including its truly confusing nature).8 
8 
The State's reliance on Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314,323 and 
n.30 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs, 678 P,2d 298 (Utah 1984), for 
the proposition that the ARTEC records were excludible because they were too remote, is misplaced. 
See State's brief at 33. Terry is a civil case in which the trial court properly excluded some only 
details concerning the plaintiffs prior actions for several reasons in addition to the remoteness of 
the incident in question, including the fact that it bore on the issue of damages and may have 
prejudiced the jurors' assessment of liability. Terry, 605 P.2d at 323. 
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Given that Dr. Leis's pivotal conclusion that Ms. Barndt was a homicide victim, rather than 
a suicide victim, was based in part on a lack of "any background history that she was suicidal" (R. 
355), the existence of this history was not too remote to be probative in this case, and would not have 
been unfairly prejudicial to any other issue, and the trial court should not have completely excluded 
the records from evidence. 
C. THE RECORDS WERE ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE 
MS. BARNDT'S STATE OF MIND. 
The State argues that the ARTEC records were not admissible under the state of mind 
exception to the hearsay rule, because Ms. Barndt's statements in 1986 that she had attempted 
suicide in the past did not bear on her state of mind at the time the statement was made or at the time 
of her death in 1990. State's brief at 34 through 38. 
Ms. Barndt's statement that she had attempted suicide at some point in her past bore on her 
state of mind in 1986, as one capable of contemplating and attempting suicide. Through the 
testimony of Dr. Leis and various other witnesses, the State repeatedly introduced the idea that Ms. 
Barndt was not of a suicidal state of mind in 1990 because she was characteristically and historically 
not of a mind to attempt suicide, and her statement that she did attempt suicide in the ARTEC 
records thus was also relevant in 1990.9 
9 
See State v.Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377,1380 (Utah 1977)("Where it is claimed the deceased 
committed suicide there would seem to be relevance in the hearsay statements of the decedent which 
would tend to explain acts or conduct on the part of the declarant."); State v. Auble. 754 P.2d 935, 
937 (Utah 1988)(allowing for the admission of out-of-court statements of alleged homicide victim 
to establish victim's state of mind if defense of suicide puts victim's state of mind in issue); State 
v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221,1227 (Utah 1989)(out-of-court statei lents of alleged homicide victim are 
admissible by prosecution if defense of suicide puts victim's state of mind in issue); State v. Wetzel 
868 P.2d 64, 68-69 (Utah 1994)(if defense of suicide puts decedent's state of mind in issue, 
decedent's out-of-court statements bearing on that issue may be admissible for the prosecution). 
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D. THE RECORDS WERE ADMISSIBLE TO ESTABLISH MS. BARNDT'S 
CHARACTER AS ONE CAPABLE OF ATTEMPTING SUICIDE. 
In response to Jaeger's argument that the ARTEC recoids were admissible to establish Ms. 
Barndt's character as one capable of attempting suicide under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(a) and 
405, the State relies exclusively on inapposite cases.10 
The State cites numerous cases in support of its claim that the ARTEC records were 
inadmissible under the state of mind exception. State's brief at 37-38. Review of the cases 
demonstrates their lack of supportive authority. 
In Terry, supra, a civil case, the incident in question was not completely excluded from 
evidence, but details were, because the evidence was admitted on the issue of damages, and might 
have unfairly prejudiced the case on liability. 605 P.2d at 322-323. Here, the attempted suicide was 
completely excluded from evidence, and its admission went to the heart of the most contested point 
in this criminal case — whether Ms. Barndt committed suicide, or whether the State had proved she 
was a homicide victim. 
The State cites State v. Kelly, 953 S.W.2d 73, 83 (Mo.Ct.App. 1997), for this proposition: 
"statements of deceased victim not admissible under state of mind exception to show victim 
committed suicide where defendant did not claim that he was involved in her death". State's brief 
at 37. The Kelly case is aper curiam opinion which does not appear to discuss anything mentioned 
by the State in its parenthetical, but discusses the use of hearsay testimony under the state of mind 
exception to establish a defendant's motive. 
The State cites United States v. Veltmann. 6 F.3d 1483, 1493-95 (11th Cir. 1993), for this 
proposition: "in arson and fraud case, error to exclude, under state of mind exception, deceased's 
videotaped deposition testimony and handwritten letters containing statements that deceased 
intended to commit suicide". State's brief at 37. Veltmann was a homicide and fraud case, which 
involved the improper exclusion of a videotaped deposition of a non-victim, detailing the victim's 
past suicidal history. 
The State cites State v. Walker. 422 S.E.2d 716, 722 (N.C.), cert denied. 508 U.S. 919 
(1993), for this proposition: "homicide victim's 'documented' history of using the same gun to 
threatened suicide and her statement, one week, before her death, that she would 'kill herself before 
she would live without defendant' admissible under state of mind exception; nevertheless, evidence 
was sufficient to convict of murder." State's brief at 37-38. The propriety of admission of evidence 
of the victim's suicidal history under the state of mind exception was not addressed on appeal in 
Walker; the evidence was only summarized in the court's rejection of a claim of insufficient 
evidence. 
10 
State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), was recently limited by the amendment of Utah 
Rule of Evidence 404(b), and in any event has no application to the issue before the Court in this 
case. Doporto deals with prior bad acts evidence admitted against a criminal defendant under 
12 
The State argues that the ARTEC records were lacking in probative value, because Ms. 
Bamdt's statements were the only evidence of her attempted suicide. The ARTEC records include 
mention of an attempted suicide without attributing the allegation to Ms. Bamdt, and also reflect that 
a suicide attempt was a basis for Ms. Barndt's initial referral to the ARTEC program. See defense 
exhibits 45 and 45A. 
While Judge Wilkinson seems to have been confused into doubting whether a suicide attempt 
occurred by the statements in the ARTEC records indicating tha* Ms. Bamdt had no suicidal ideation 
at the time she was in the program, Judge Wilkinson never found or implied that Ms. Bamdt was not 
a credible source of information regarding her own history of suicide (R. 415-417, 657-658, 668). 
His rulings seem to reflect his belief that Ms. Bamdt may well have attempted suicide as a juvenile, 
but that this evidence did not bear on whether she was likely to have done so as an adult (R. 415-417, 
657-658, 668). 
The State argues that the ARTEC records were lacking in probative value, because Jaeger 
presented no expert testimony that any attempted suicide by Ms. Bamdt when she was a juvenile 
bore on the likelihood of her committing suicide as an adult. State's brief at 39. 
There is no requirement under rules of evidence 404(a) and 405 that a proponent of relevant 
character evidence present expert testimony to establish the inferential probative value of the 
evidence. Assuming arguendo that such expert testimony were required, it was presented in this 
404(b), not the admission of evidence bearing on a victim's character, which is directly at issue. 
State v. Tarafa. 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986), likewise deals with the admission of prior bad 
acts evidence against a criminal defendant, and has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence 
concerning a victim's contested character trait. 
State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980), is an aggravated sexual assault and aggravated 
kidnaping case focusing on the admissibility of the sexual history of rape victims, a topic that is 
lacking in relevance here. 
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case, when the medical examiner testified that background history of suicide would have borne on 
his assessment of whether Ms. Barndt committed suicide in 1990 (e.g. R. 355). 
E. JAEGER DID NOT HAVE A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE 
UNDER RULE OF EVIDENCE 705 OR OTHERWISE. 
The State apparently does not contest that the ARTEC records should have been admissible 
to test Dr. Leis's opinion that Ms. Barndt was a homicide victim. See State's brief at 40. 
However, the State claims that Jaeger could have somehow used the ARTEC records to 
impeach Dr. Leis, despite the fact that the trial court ruled the ARTEC records inadmissible. State's 
brief at 40-41. 
The State apparently claims that Judge Wilkinson ruled the ARTEC records admissible for 
purposes of challenging Dr. Leis's analysis of the homicide/suicide issue. State's brief at 40. 
Review of the judge's ruling, supra, demonstrates that Judge Wilkinson preliminarily indicated that 
Dr. Leis's testimony opened the door, but that the judge would not admit the ARTEC records until 
he reviewed them (R. 416-417). 
While the State would have the Court believe that Judge Wilkinson would have permitted 
the defense to admit the records to impeach Dr. Leis if the defense had presented Judge Wilkinson 
with expert testimony establishing whether or not the ARTEC records were the type of information 
a professional would rely on in determining cause of death, this was not Judge Wilkinson's ruling. 
As previously discussed, in mentioning expert testimony, Judge Wilkinson merely queried whether 
either side would be presenting expert testimony to establish that Ms. Barndt's statements when she 
was a juvenile countered the lay witnesses' testimony that Barndt was not a suicidal adult (R. 416-
417). Assuming that the trial court indeed considered expert testimony a prerequisite to the 
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admission of the ARTEC records to impeach Dr. Leis, Dr. Leii did in fact testify that the existence 
of a psychiatric history of attempting suicide would have influenced his professional opinion (e.g. 
R. 368). Nonetheless, after reading the ARTEC records, Judge Wilkinson entirely excluded the 
ARTEC records from evidence (R. 657, 668). 
Aside from the fact that Judge Wilkinson's ruling excluded the ARTEC records completely, 
it would not have been appropriate to introduce the medical records through Dr. Leis, because he was 
not the custodian of records from the program, and had no knowledge of Ms. Barndt's suicidal 
history, and thus had no personal knowledge of and could not have authenticated the ARTEC 
records. See e^ g. R. 416 (Judge Wilkinson would not permit defense counsel to interrogate Ms. 
Clark about the contents of the ARTEC records because she was "not the proper person," but 
requested the records keeper from ARTEC to appear). 
The State's suggestion that Mr. Jaeger had a fair opportunity to present his defense because 
defense counsel might have asked other family members about Ms. Barndt's suicidal history is 
nonsensical. The family members' stance that Ms. Barndt was not suicidal by nature was already 
clear on record (e.g. 431, 440, 442, 443, 456-458, 484, 488). Defense counsel would have been 
acting against Mr. Jaeger's best interests if he had asked this string of witnesses whether they knew 
of Ms. Barndt's history of suicide, and given them the chance to answer in the negative and stand 
unimpeachable by the inadmissible ARTEC records, defense counsel's only proof of Ms. Barndt's 
suicidal history. The State's authority cited in support of its argument that Jaeger had a fair 
opportunity to present his defense is not supportive.11 
The State cites State v. Moton. 749 P.2d 639, 644 (Utah 1988), for this proposition: 
"confrontation satisfied where even though defendant was precluded from asking some questions, 
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F. THE EXCLUSION OF THE ARTEC RECORDS WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Because the trial court's ruling excluding the ARTEC records violated Jaeger's federal 
constitutional rights to present a defense and to confrontation, it is the State's burden to prove the 
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. S>ee e^g. State v. Villarreah 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 
1995). 
The State's argument that what it considers to be simple evidentiary, rather than 
constitutional error, was harmless, is premised on the State's statement of the facts, State's brief at 
42, which is stated in the light most favorable to the verdict, and wanting in accuracy. 
court allowed a 'plentitude* of relevant questions and defendant took the stand". State's brief at 41 -
42. The portion ofMoton cited is ^plurality opinion. The majority of the Court apparently would 
have found that the trial court erred in limiting the defendant's cross-examination. Compare Moton 
at 644 (opinion of Justice Howe and then-Chief Justice Hall)(finding no error) with id. at 644 
(concurring opinion of then-Justice Zimmerman, joined by Justice Durham)(finding that court's 
limitation of questioning was probably error, but harmless); and id. at 644-646 (dissenting opinion 
of Justice Stewart)(arguing that limitation of cross-examination was reversible error). Moton is not 
controlling here, where the trial court not only limited cross-examination, but actually prevented the 
presentation of evidence most key to the defense. 
The State cites State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33,35 (Utah 1981), for the proposition that it was 
not error for the trial court "to refuse to instruct on defendant's theory of the case where evidence 
in support of defense was 'general and vague in nature[.]" State's brief at 42. Harding involved the 
trial court's instructing the jury to disregard the defense of self defense when the evidence failed to 
establish the defense. Harding does not condone excluding defense evidence, and is thus inapposite. 
The State cites State v. Johns. 615 P.2d 1260,1264 (Utah 1980), for the proposition that the 
"'right to confrontation requires only that the accused be permitted to introduce all relevant and 
admissible evidence.'" State's brief at 42. In Johns, the Court affirmed the exclusion of evidence 
concerning the victim's promiscuity, finding that it had no bearing on her consent in the encounter 
with the victim. See id. In the instant case, the evidence that Ms. Barndt had reported attempting 
suicide was relevant to impeaching the medical examiner's opinion that Ms. Barndt must have been 
killed, which opinion was based in part on the fact that she supposedly had no history of attempting 
suicide. The evidence was also necessary to challenge the State's evidence from numerous other 
witnesses that suicide was inconsistent with Ms. Barndt's fundamental nature. The evidence was 
also key to Mr. Jaeger's fundamental defense that Ms. Barndt committed suicide. Because Jaeger 
was not permitted to present this relevant and admissible evidence, Johns demonstrates a violation 
of his right to confrontation. 
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In arguing harmless error, the State claims that the absence of any known history of suicide 
was not a major factor in the medical examiner's opinion that Earndt did not commit suicide, and 
argues that the lack of suicide history was only discussed "in connection with his conclusion that the 
range of firing was atypical of suicide." State's brief at 42 n.32. 
The lack of a suicide history and range of firing were separate, unrelated, major factors 
underlying the medical examiner's opinion that Barndt did not commit suicide (R. 355, 368). 
The State argues that Jaeger is unrealistic to "speculate[s] that the ARTEC records would 
have caused the medical examiner to change his opinion." State's brief at 42. n.32. 
Regardless of whether Jaeger could persuade Dr. Leis to change his mind with the ARTEC 
records, Jaeger's jurors should have had the opportunity to consider whether Leis's opinion was 
flawed as a result of the lack of this information, and whether other witnesses attesting to Ms. 
Barndt's life-loving nature were fully informed or honest in their testimony. 
Because the attempted suicide evidence bore directly on the ultimate question in this case, 
the exclusion of the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See e^ g. State v. Emmett 
839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992)(error going to heart of defense is reversible). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should order a new trial in which the ARTEC records are admissible. The Court 
should also require the trial court to give the jury the defendant's requested reasonable doubt 
instruction.12 The Court should also instruct Judge Wilkinson that in the event of a conviction, he 
12 
In writing the opening brief, defense counsel was not aware that this Court condoned the 
reasonable doubt instruction given here as a correct statement of Utah law, in State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219,1232-33 (Utah 1997). He maintains that Jaeger's requested instruction is superior to that 
given, and that Jaeger was entitled to the instruction as a matter of federal constitutional law. 
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is to comply with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1. 
Respectfully submitted this £>L day of $^L, $9& 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Mr. Jaeger/ /."'"") 
L. CLARK DONALDSON 
Attorney for Mr. Jaeger 
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